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1. Overview 
The mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries, particularly through transparent, 
fair and efficient tax systems, is regarded as a central means of implementation for the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Recognising the crucial role that domestic revenue 
mobilisation plays in financing sustainable development, international donors seek to intensify 
their support in this area over the next years. Many of the international development partners 
(including the UK as one of its founding members) have joined the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI) and 
made the commitment to collectively double their support until 2020 as part of their membership 
in ATI. 
To date, international support to taxation and domestic revenue mobilisation has been rather 
strongly focused on the national level. For instance, DFID’s centrally managed programmes, and 
HMRC’s capacity work, have considered national taxation collected by a central revenue 
authority. However, there might be some compelling arguments to extent support to levels others 
than the national level. This report considers two distinct areas: (1) the informal sector (which is, 
by definition, outside of the national economy), and (2) the subnational level. In particular, the 
report focuses on the revenue, growth and governance implications of taxation in these areas 
and provides some recent experience from developing countries.  
A large informal sector is found to be a persistent phenomenon in low-income and emerging 
economies. Taxation, in turn, is often seen as a key ingredient of formalisation, and developing 
countries might benefit from increases in revenues, growth effects from improved productivity, 
and a more vital relationship between taxpayers and the state authorities. A key result of the 
report is that these effects, while convincing in theory, are often hard to assess empirically. They 
are also rather complex, which makes it difficult to draw some general conclusions whether 
informal sector taxation can lead to improvements in some or all of the above areas. 
Regarding the subnational level, a common observation is that subnational governments 
(SNGs)1 seriously suffer from appropriate financial resources, particularly from own-source 
taxation. This might be a serious impediment for delivering local quality institutions, which in turn 
has some negative impacts on SNG governance. Subnational taxation might not only be a 
source of self-financing for SNGs, but also serve some broader growth and governance goals. 
Again, the implications of taxation for these areas are complex. Growth, for instance, strongly 
depends on the incentive structures of central and local governments, which can differ 
substantially. Regarding the governance implications, for which there is only very limited 
evidence in the literature, local level taxation is for instance driven by the varying interests and 
power of local elites. 
The key observations of the report and potential research gaps can be summarised as follows: 
Taxation of the informal sector 
                                                   
1 As defined by the OECD a subnational government (SNG) is a decentralised entity whose governance bodies 
are elected through universal suffrage and which has general responsibilities and some autonomy with respect to 
budget, staff and assets (OECD & UCLG, 2016) 
2 
• There is broad consensus that informal sector activities are widespread in developing 
countries, and that informality relates to some key business sectors, such as retail and 
construction 
• The exact size of the informal sector is however hard to assess, and commonly used 
figures from the literature have become subject to some serious criticism 
• The revenue potential from the informal sector can be substantial, but broad-based 
taxation might come at the expense of significant administrative costs due to a large 
number of informal firms and entrepreneurs, and the difficulties of monitoring them 
• The literature focuses more on the indirect revenue effects of informal sector taxation, 
such as long-term effects on growth and governance effects, but there is no strong 
empirical support in the literature (research gap) 
• Regarding growth, informal firms are often found to be less productive than formal ones 
and formalisation might help to improve productivity through various channels 
• The benefits of formalisation, including through taxation, might however strongly depend 
on firm size and other factors, which are not yet studied to a sufficient extent in the 
literature (research gap) 
• Governance is affected by the interplay between informal sector taxation, accountability 
and quasi-voluntary tax compliance 
• Taxation of the informal sector can help to strengthen political participation and collective 
actions, but empirical evidence on the effects are limited (research gap) 
Subnational taxes 
• Self-financing abilities of subnational government are crucial to ensure strong local 
institutions, and to provide good local governance 
• Recent data suggests that subnational governments in low-income countries frequently 
lack financial resources, particularly from shared or own-source taxes and predominantly 
rely on central government subsidies and transfers 
• Central governments can be a limiting factor for subnational taxation, given that they do 
not want to compromise own revenue positions or do not wish to assign taxing rights to 
local governments when the latter lack the necessary capacities 
• Local governments can be, in some instances, more effective in taxing parts of the 
revenue base that are out of the reach of central governments (e.g. the informal sector), 
or that are less attractive for the latter due to high administrative costs (e.g. small 
businesses) 
• Recent evidence suggests that subnational governments with sufficient own-source tax 
revenues are less generous in offering local tax incentives in relation to governments that 
depend on central government transfers 
• National and local governments might differ in their growth and development objectives 
and spending patterns, and an increase in local taxation might lead to reduced pro-
growth spending on the central level 
• Incentives for local pro-growth policies are shaped by the dependence on different 
sources of subnational financing (own-source tax revenues vs. central government 
transfers and subsidies) 
3 
• In general, there is lack of systematic evidence on the growth and development effects of 
local level taxation (research gap) 
• Subnational taxation can contribute to good governance through “bargaining” over tax 
payments and the benefits received in return 
• From a governance perspective, subnational taxation can also give rise to collective 
action, which also carries the risk of tax resistance from local elites 
• There is lack of literature focusing on the relationship between governance, taxation and 
state-building on the subnational level (research gap) 
• Property taxation is the predominant form of subnational taxation in developing counties 
and is argued to be closest to a “benefit tax” 
• Recent country evidence from Africa suggests that the success of property taxes and/or 
property taxes crucially depend on a variety of factors, including political resistance, 
administrative capacity building, and good local governance 
2. Taxation of the informal sector2 
The formalisation of informal sector activities has received some particular attention in the 
international development agenda, and taxation is often regarded as a key ingredient (Joshi et 
al., 2014). In particular, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda outlines that the international community 
will need to invest “(…) continuing efforts to integrate the informal sector into the formal economy 
in line with country circumstances” (UN, 2015, p. 11). In the same vein, Target 8.3 of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) stresses the need to “(…) encourage the formalisation 
and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (…)”3 in order to promote sustainable 
and inclusive economic growth. 
Widespread informal activities are usually regarded to be a persistent phenomenon in developing 
countries (Besley & Persson, 2014; La Porta & Shleifer, 2014). It has been suggested, for 
example, that some of the largest and fastest growing business sectors in African countries, such 
as the retail and construction sector, are dominated by informal firms and entrepreneurs 
(Benjamin et al., 2014). Recent data from Schneider & Buehn (2018) displayed in Figures 1 and 
2 provide an overview of the size of the informal economy for different country income groups 
and world regions:  
                                                   
2 This report relies on the legal definition of informality, which is most commonly used throughout literature (Joshi 
et al., 2014). According to this definition, informality depends on the legal status of a firm, that is whether it is 
registered or not, and whether it complies with legal rules and obligations or not. As Joshi et al. (2014, pp. 1326-
1327) state: “(…) firms in the informal sector are there because they contravene – or are not subject to – some of 
a variety of rules and regulations, including labour laws, environmental laws, registration, and taxation”. A second 
important element is the lack of visibility of informal actors, which usually seek to hide their non-compliant 
behaviours from governmental institutions (Feige, 2016a). 
3 Source: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg8. 
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Source: Schneider & Buehn (2018). 
Figure 1 shows that the informal sector in low-income countries (LICs) is on average twice as 
large as in OECD countries, and that the size of the informal sector diminishes with country 
income size. As Medina et al. (2017) argue, the latter observation is likely to reflect increases in 
government capacities, and stronger incentives for formalisation in high-income countries.  
 
Source: Schneider & Buehn (2018). 
A similar pattern is shown in Figure 2. The informal sector is largest in the Latin America and the 
Caribbean region (39.9%), followed by developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (37.8%). The 
lowest figures can be found for East Asia (22.1%) and, again, the OECD countries (17.3%). The 
figures, however, should be treated with caution because the measurement of the informal 
sector, in general, is challenging; also, the particular estimation technique used to derive the data 
cited above has become subject to some serious criticism (see Appendix A for details). 
From a revenue perspective, a large informal sector renders it highly difficult for low-income 
countries’ governments to finance sustainable development from broad-based taxation. Improved 
formalisation can help to bring more taxpayers into the tax net because firms that wish to benefit 
from the formal economy (e.g. through better access to finance) eventually become more visible 
to the tax authorities (Besley & Persson, 2014). This is again linked to the overall notion of 
improved domestic revenue mobilisation, which is a core topic of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda 
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Figure 1: Average size of the informal economy by country 
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(UN, 2015) and also covered by SDG Target 17.14. In terms of growth, formalisation might give 
rise to improved productivity of small informal firms, which are frequently thought to be less 
efficient than formal ones (La Porta & Shleifer, 2014). Although taxation leads to additional 
business costs, that could otherwise be avoided, formalisation can bring some important benefits 
for informal firms and employees (Joshi et al., 2014). Informal sector taxation is also inherently 
linked to good governance, given that quasi-voluntary compliance and tax morale are driven by 
governmental accountability and responsiveness (Joshi et al., 2014). 
Drawing on these initial observations, the following section of the Helpdesk Report studies the 
effects of informal sector taxation on revenue, growth and governance in more detail. It is partly 
based on a recent contribution by Joshi et al. (2014), who provide a comprehensive literature 
overview on the topic. It also draws on some recent evidence from four Sub-Saharan African 
countries based on a study by Dube & Casale (2016).  
Revenue implications 
As outlined in the start of this report, the informal sector can have some serious negative impacts 
on developing countries’ tax revenue potential and, consequently, their ability to raise domestic 
revenues for financing sustainable development. However, as outlined in Joshi et al. (2014), 
efforts to improve informal sector taxation must not necessarily lead to substantial increases in 
governmental revenues in case that the associated costs of tax collection are high. In this sense, 
taxation of the informal sector as a means of revenue mobilisation is inherently a matter of costs 
and benefits.  
The large number of potential taxpayers in the informal sector, and the difficulties of monitoring 
“hidden” entrepreneurs and small-scale firms, can give rise to serious revenue collection costs 
for tax authorities in developing countries. At the same time, the revenue potential of taxpayers in 
the informal sector is fairly modest, as their taxable incomes are usually quite low (Joshi et al., 
2014). Informal sector activities are often located in rural areas or come from self-employed 
sellers living near the subsistence level (La Porta & Shleifer, 2014).  
Consequently, given the low “value for money” in revenue terms, tax administrations have often 
given little priority to the taxation of the informal sector firms (Fjeldstad, 2014), which can also be 
related to equity consideration, namely that taxation falls more strongly on the shoulders of low-
income informal firms (Joshi et al., 2014). From a conceptual perspective, the direct revenue 
impacts of informal sector taxation and the associated costs might also be highly difficult to 
assess as data availability and quality is poor for many developing countries. 
Having this in mind, Joshi et al. (2014) point out that arguments in favour of an expanded 
informal sector taxation often rely more strongly on the indirect benefits of the latter. From a long-
term perspective, formalisation might contribute to the overall productivity of informal firms and, 
thus, ultimately lead to grow and a higher revenue potential (Gasper et al., 2016; Joshi et al., 
2014)5. This argument is also linked to broader governance implications, namely that informal 
sector taxation will contribute to building a social norm of voluntary tax compliance as firms 
                                                   
4 “Strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, including through international support to developing countries, to 
improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection.” (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17) 
5 It is argued that informal firms, in general, are much less productive than formal firms. 
6 
expand over time (Joshi et al., 2014). This line of reasoning can also been related to overall 
economic growth and development, as recently noted by Gaspar et al. (2016). The emergence of 
a “taxpaying culture” is likely to come hand-in-hand with good governance and strong 
governmental institutions, which eventually gives rise to economic growth and development 
through various channels. These effects can be even mutually reinforcing, causing a “virtuous 
circle” of good governance, voluntary compliance, and growth. 
Leaving the informal sector out of the tax net can be justified from a purely economic perspective 
(cost-benefit-analysis), but might have some important implications in terms of perceived 
horizontal equity. Larger formal firms might consider it as unfair that small informal firms remain 
untaxed, which in turn potentially affects their own willingness to pay taxes (Joshi et al., 2014). 
As shown in Figure 3, formal firms in developing countries indeed see informal sector 
competition as an important obstacle for their business operations, and this might also impact 
their overall perception of fairness. Finally, again from an equity perspective, informal firms might 
benefit from taxation by improved predictability and less exposure to arbitrary state actions, 
harassment, and corruption (Joshi et al., 2014).  
Empirical evidence on the indirect effects of informal sector taxation is scarce, however. As noted 
by Joshi et al. (2014), there is no evidence on the long-term effects of informal sector taxation 
channelled through an emerging social norm of voluntary compliance. Regarding the relationship 
between informality and tax morale, some studies suggest that there is a negative impact of tax 
morale on the informal economy. In a cross-country study, Torgler & Schneider (2007) find a 
positive and significant correlation between the size of the shadow economy (as measured 
through the MIMIC6 approach) and tax morale. Gërxhani & van de Werfhorst (2011) report a 
similar result for Albania. The authors find that individuals with a low level of (self-reported) tax 
morale are more likely to participate in the informal economy. However, as noted by Joshi et al. 
(2014), these studies are only able to demonstrate a correlation between the two variables rather 
then causal effects, which might be more interesting from a policy perspective. In this sense, it is 
not possible to judge whether low tax morale causes informality, or whether informality leads to 
low tax morale (or if there might be even a circular relationship).  
Finally, the few studies available do not allow to draw any general conclusions regarding the 
positive or negative effects in terms of predictability and equal treatment of informal firms by the 
state authorities (Joshi et al., 2014).   
Growth implications 
Broad-based taxation is a central element in the process of formalisation, and can have some 
strong implications for economic growth (Joshi et al., 2014). A particularly important channel 
through which growth could be triggered is the increase in firm productivity, which is usually low 
for informal sector firms in developing countries.  
Empirical findings suggest that the “productivity gap” between formal and informal firms can be 
substantial. La Porta & Shleifer (2008), for instance, show for a sample of developing countries 
that the value-added of informal firms is only 15% when compared to the value-added of formal 
firms. For some countries, it this ratio can even become as small as 1%-10%. As outlined by La 
Porta & Shleifer (2014), this lack of productivity is driven by some “generic” elements of informal 
                                                   
6 “Multi Indicators, Multiple Causes” 
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sector firms, which include their relatively small size, inefficiency, as well as the observation that 
they are often run by poorly educated entrepreneurs. In addition, small informal firms also have 
fewer opportunities to benefit from economies of scale and exporting opportunities, given that 
they operate outside of the legal system (Besley & Persson, 2014).  
For formal firms, competition with the informal sector might have some serious consequences for 
their business operations. This might be particularly true for larger or less poor informal firms 
competing with formal firms with a similar or lower income (Dube & Casale, 2016). Figure 3 
shows that informal practices might be a serious obstacle for business activities of formally 
registered firms in developing countries. Evidence from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys Data 
suggests that, on average, 61.3% of formal firms in low-income have to compete with 
unregistered or informal companies, compared to only 32.0% in OECD countries. Likewise, 
33.4% of firms in low-income countries identify informal sector competition as a major obstacle 
for doing business (compared to 14.2% in OECD countries).  
 
Figure 3: Informal sector competition 
  
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys Data (2010-2017). 
In addition, as argued by Singh (2014), the informal sector may limit overall state capacities, 
which are necessary for the expansion of a more productive formal sector. Other studies have 
argued that smaller informal firms especially are too inefficient and too different from formal ones 
to pose a threat on the latter (La Porta & Shleifer, 2014). In addition, while informal firms might 
be able to reap the benefits of non-taxation, they are at the same time excluded from some other 
positive effects of formalisation. 
Opting into the formal economy, which also requires compliance with tax laws and obligations, 
might bring some important benefits for informal sector firms, which can ultimately trigger growth 
and productivity. These include the access to capital markets, new market opportunities, less 
exposure to police and municipal officers, and access to training and capacity building (Joshi et 
al., 2014). Furthermore, informal employees might benefit from formalisation through the access 
to social protection, more adequate contracts, higher wages, and reduced vulnerability in case of 
unemployment or retirement (Brys et al., 2016). According to Joshi et al. (2014), there is a 
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and better labour contracts. These effects, however, depend on firm characteristics and are more 
often related to mid-sized firms rather than to small or micro ones. 
However, as argued by La Porta & Shleifer (2014), other studies draw a quite different picture 
and suggest that informal firms rarely become formal even when barriers for entry are reduced, 
and that they are too inefficient to survive in formal markets. In addition, they claim that informal 
firms are too different from formal ones (e.g. in terms of the products offered) to pose a threat on 
the latter. According to La Porta & Shleifer (2014), these observations are supportive of a “dual 
view” of informality, namely that informal and formal firms are largely segregated. 
In summary, the effects of informal sector taxation on growth are complex, and the results of the 
studies cited above are somehow inconclusive. However, as Joshi et al. (2014) note, there is a 
growing body of literature that empirically supports the assumption that formalisation (including 
through taxation) can have significant positive impacts in terms of profitability, investments, and 
growth. Yet, there remains uncertainty whether these effects also apply to small or micro informal 
firms, and which channels are the most important ones.  
Governance implications 
A number of governance implications of informal sector taxation have already been mentioned in 
the previous sections. The line of reasoning is related to an implicit “fiscal contract” between 
taxpayers and the state, which is based on the principles of accountability, legitimacy and mutual 
trust, and encompasses a social norm of paying taxes. 
Taxation of the informal sector allows informal firms to hold the state accountable for the use 
their payments, and can thus contribute to an emerging sense of democratic participation and 
ownership over governmental actions7. The state, in turn, has an incentive to demonstrate 
accountability and responsiveness to taxpayers in order to foster voluntary tax compliance based 
on a social norm of paying taxes (Joshi et al., 2014). As outlined earlier, the informal sector is 
inherently hard to tax, and improved voluntary compliance might be a cost-efficient way of raising 
additional taxes when compared to pure enforcement through tax authorities. State legitimacy 
also depends on the existence of strong governmental institutions and state capacities, of which 
the capacity to tax is a particular important one (Gaspar et al., 2016). In addition, the contractual 
relationship between taxpayers and the state implies that informal sector taxation might help to 
strengthen collective action and political participation among business associations in the 
informal sector (Joshi et al., 2014).  
As noted by Joshi et al. (2014), some studies find a positive relationship between informal sector 
taxation, accountability and collective action, but evidence is limited. The effects described in the 
literature relate to different channels of good governance and include bargaining between the 
state and informal business associations, stronger public engagement, as well as higher levels of 
trust resulting from formalisation. At the same time, Joshi et al. (2014) point out that the success 
of bargaining between informal associations and the state authorities can be crucially affected by 
the organisational structure and political power of the former. Informal sector taxation might even 
emphasise the weaknesses of informal sector associations and lead to a marginalisation of 
certain groups, as well as to a stronger fragmentation of political voice. 
                                                   
7 In this sense, the famous motto of the Boston Tea Party (1773) has often been turned around in the developing 
country context: "No representation without taxation". 
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Policy implications and experiences 
The specific characteristics of the informal sector render it challenging to directly apply formal 
sector tax policies. In some instances, the informal sector is instead covered indirectly through 
standard tax regimes, as in the case of the Value Added Tax (VAT). Unregistered informal sector 
firms have an incentive to enter the tax system in order to claim VAT refunds in case that they 
are a dealing with formal firms. Another indirect approach is the reliance of withholding taxes on 
transactions with informal firms, which are collected by formal firms or the government. Again, 
withholding taxes provides an incentive to become formal because withheld payments can be 
credited against formal tax liabilities (Joshi et al., 2014). 
In addition, developing countries increasingly rely on simplified taxes for assessing the informal 
sector that often take the form of so-called presumptive taxes. Under a presumptive tax regime, 
tax liabilities are estimated on the basis of simple indicators of business performance (such as 
turnover) or certain “visible” firm characteristics (such as transport capacities), and taxes are 
often paid on a lump-sum basis. The rationale behind presumptive taxes is to collect some 
additional tax revenues with a reasonable amount of administrative and tax compliance costs 
(Dube & Casale, 2016), which somehow mirrors the economic “cost-benefit-analysis” described 
earlier.  
In a recent publication, Dube & Casale (2016) provide some evidence on presumptive taxation in 
four countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Although the 
presumptive taxes vary greatly with respect to their design, coverage and implementation, there 
are some common observations regarding their effectiveness and efficiency, which turns out to 
be generally limited. Some tax administrations found it difficult to implement the presumptive 
taxes due to severe capacity limitations, in particular with respect to adequate manpower. 
Administrative constraints also sometimes lead to a lack of monitoring and enforcement, so that 
taxpayers failed to pay. The lack of compliance was also stressed by the fact that taxpayers were 
not informed about the taxes, and that they questioned the legitimacy of tax collectors. More 
details on country experiences can be found in the Appendix B. 
3. Subnational taxation 
It is a core assumption of decentralisation that local and regional governments are more 
accountable and responsive to citizens’ needs and preferences regarding central governments. 
However, for decentralisation to be effective, subnational government (SNGs) need to rely on 
adequate financial resources, including through their own mobilisation (Martinez-Vasquez, 2013; 
Smoke, 2013). The critical role of subnational governments and their financing has also been 
recently recognised on the international level among others in the course of the third UN 
Financing for Development Conference (UN, 2015). The Addis Ababa Action Agenda includes 
the global commitment “(…) to scaling up international cooperation to strengthen capacities of 
municipalities and other local authorities” and to “(…) strive to support local governments in their 
efforts to mobilise revenues as appropriate” (UN, 2015, p. 16). 
Despite this fact, empirical evidence suggests that subnational revenue mobilisation in 
developing countries is rather weak (Smoke, 2013). Figure 4 shows that SNG revenues in low-
income countries made up only 1.6% of GDP and 7.8% of public revenues in 2013. The share of 
SNG revenues rises with country income and is largest for the group high-income countries 
(13.0% and 30.9%): 
10 
Figure 4: SNG revenues (2013, by country income groups) 
 
Source: OECD & UCLG (2016). 
Figure 5 (a) also suggests that SNG revenues primarily come from central governmental grants 
and subsidies (63.1% of revenues), followed by tax revenues (24.1%) and other revenue sources 
(12.8%) in low-income countries. While tax revenues rise with country income, the difference 
between low-income and high-income countries is rather modest and accounts to 10.4 
percentage points. It has to be noted that tax revenues do not necessarily reflect only own-
source SNG revenues (which could be indicative of the level of decentralisation), but also tax 
revenues that are shared between SNGs and the central government (OECD & UCLG, 2016). 
Figure 5 (b) reveals that SNG tax revenues of low-income countries only account to 0.4% of GDP 
on average, whereas the shares in low-middle, upper-middle and higher income countries are 
significantly larger in relative terms (2.1%, 2.8%, and 4.9%, respectively). In addition, SNG tax 
revenues make up only 2.2% of total public tax revenues, compared to 19.2% in high-income 
countries. This lack of relevance is likely to show that SNGs in low-income countries do not 
benefit from the sharing of taxes (OECD & UCLG, 2016). 
Figure 5: SNG revenue sources and tax revenues (2013, by country income groups) 
  
Source: OECD & UCLG (2016). 
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The figures above might be indicative for the lack of international support to strengthening 
subnational taxation, with the former being mostly focused on the national level (Fjeldstad, 2014). 
In addition to that, revenue autonomy of SNGs is often limited by the central government due to 
concerns over national fiscal policy management and capacity concerns, as well as a reluctance 
to possibly give up own revenue positions (Bird, 2011; Smoke, 2013). Local authorities might be 
unable to reap the benefits of autonomy because they lack the necessary capacities and 
knowledge, or they face serious political and fiscal constraints that render local autonomy less 
attractive (Smoke, 2013). 
This section focuses on the role that subnational taxation can play in supporting revenue 
generation, growth, and good governance in developing countries. A particular focus lies on the 
use of property taxation, which is often seen as the most promising tax policy instrument on the 
subnational level (Kelly, 2013), and which represents the largest single source of own revenues 
for SNGs worldwide (Moore, 2013). 
Revenue implications 
Taxation, be it on the national or subnational level, has the primary objective of raising revenues 
for financing public goods and services and for providing quality state institutions. Depending on 
their degree of tax autonomy and other factors, SNGs in developing countries are sometimes 
more and sometimes less successful in raising own source taxes. A general impression, though, 
is that SNGs in low-income countries significantly suffer from financial resources in general and 
own-source or shared tax revenues in particular (see Figures 4 and 5). 
In general, from a political economy perspective, central and local government can be thought to 
compete over the same taxable incomes. The central government might thus be reluctant to give 
up own revenue sources by assigning some collection rights to SNGs (Bird, 2010; UN-HABITAT, 
2015). Transfers and subsidies from the central government, which on average represent more 
than 60% of SNGs revenues in low-income countries, might also crowd out efforts for improved 
own local taxation. However, SNGs might be in some instances able to reach out to some parts 
of the revenue base that would be otherwise left untaxed by the central government, either 
because the latter is not willing due to high administrative costs (e.g. taxation of small 
businesses) or not able due to a lack of monitoring and control (e.g. informal activities). In this 
sense, SNG revenue authorities might have a comparative advantage in identifying local 
businesses for the purpose of taxation, as they oversee licensing and regulatory activities, 
among others. From the perspective of the central government, the successful implementation of 
local taxes might even lead to a better revenue position in case that own-source taxation reduces 
the need for central government transfers  (Bird, 2010).  
It has been for instance proposed to shift taxation of the informal sector to local authorities. 
SNGs are thought to be, among others, better able to negotiate with informal actors and to be 
more responsive to them, given the small local distances. These benefits can be compromised 
when SNGs lack the necessary capacities, when there is harmful competition between SNGs 
(see below), or when taxation is arbitrary and coercive (Joshi et al., 2014).  
Another important revenue aspect is related to the tax competition between SNGs, which is 
commonly seen as a direct consequence of fiscal decentralisation. SNGs that have the authority 
to tax might compete over local mobile capital, having in mind that businesses might move to 
regions with lower tax rates. It is a common argument that local tax competition can give rise to 
less extractive taxation, more efficient spending and better public services (Li, 2015). On the 
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contrary, excessive and unproductive tax competition might result in a ‘race-to-the bottom’, which 
ultimately compromises the self-financing abilities of local governments (Bird, 2010).  
On the national level, developing countries frequently use various types of tax incentives to 
attract foreign direct investments, but these policies are often inefficient and lead to 
(unnecessary) revenue losses (Kundt, 2017). For the subnational level, recent empirical 
evidence provide by Li (2016) suggests that the use of local tax incentives depends on the 
degree of fiscal autonomy of SNGs, that is whether they have the authority to tax to some 
degree. Li (2016) finds that the use of tax incentives is more pronounced when SNGs can expect 
to receive central government transfers. SNGs that rely more heavily on own-source taxation, by 
contrast, are found to be less generous in offering tax incentives and to show more fiscal 
discipline. 
Growth implications 
National growth and development objectives might significantly differ from the objectives of 
subnational governments. While central governments put strong emphasis on capital spending, 
SNGs focus more heavily on consumption goods and services. In case that taxation rights are 
given to the latter, resources are shifted away from the central government that might have 
otherwise been used for pro-growth spending for example on infrastructure (Bird, 2010). 
Another important argument is related to the different incentive structures of SNGs and their 
primary sources of financing (i.e. central government transfers or other non-tax sources 
regarding own-source tax revenues). Self-financing SNGs have stronger incentives to secure 
future tax revenue prospects than those who depend external financing. The former may 
therefore in the long run seek to facilitate growth by improving their local productivity and by 
implementing market-oriented economic policies (Bird, 2010; Pöschel & Weingast, 2013; 
Prichard, 2016). In the same vein, SNGs with a high degree of self-financing abilities have an 
incentive to spend their own tax revenues more efficiently than SNGs that rely more heavily on 
“third-party” revenues8 (Pöschel & Weingast, 2013).  
Regarding the ease of doing business and the formalisation of informal sector activities, it is 
important to ensure a high degree of cooperation between central and local governments. A lack 
can results in a large number of non-transparent taxes, charges and fees levied at the local level, 
and duplications with central government taxes. These can give rise to significant administrative 
and tax compliance costs, discourage formalisation and lead to opportunities for corruption 
(Loeprick, 2009; Everest-Phillips, 2010). The problems can be further accelerated when local 
governments excessively rely on the use of parafiscal charges, as it is the case for Serbia. A 
survey conducted by the Serbian Association of Employers for instance revealed that there is a 
total of 499 different parafiscal charges in place, which are in turn based on 150 individual tax 
laws. These charges are a significant obstacle for the business operations of particularly small 
and medium enterprises and have been linked to corruption and informality (Serbian 
Associations of Employers, 2015). In addition, the burdens imposed by the large number of 
individual charges may give rise to tax evasion, which is found to be substantial in Serbia (Kundt 
et al., 2017).  
                                                   
8 This is comparable to the famous “House Money Effect” described in the behavioural economics literature (i.e. 
individuals spend money more recklessly when it comes from a third party rather than out of their own pockets) 
(Thaler & Johnson, 1990). 
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In general, the relationship between taxation, growth and development is found to be rather 
complex9. This renders it likewise difficult to draw any meaningful conclusion on the growth-
effects of taxation on the subnational level, as argued by Bird (2010), which might be a potential 
area of future research.   
Governance implications 
A central governance argument for increased decentralisation rests on the assumption that 
SNGs have a better knowledge of the needs and preferences of local citizens, and thus provide a 
higher level of responsiveness and accountability to them (Martinez-Vasquez, 2013; Smoke, 
2013). In terms of taxation, this line of reasoning can again be related to the “bargaining” over tax 
payments and the goods and services delivered in return, which is a core element of the fiscal 
contract between citizens and state authorities. 
At the subnational level, the role of accountability is likely to be even more important and direct 
than on the national level. Local taxpayers have a better sense of what is done with “their” tax 
money, given that the benefits of local taxation are visible to them and that the tax burden is 
large enough to be noticed. Thus, they are also more likely to hold the local authorities 
accountable (Bird, 2010) and to develop a stronger sense of the social benefits of paying taxes, 
which can ultimately lead to higher levels of quasi-voluntary tax compliance (Jibao & Prichard, 
2015). For accountability to be effective, taxpayers thereby need to be able to exert control over 
SNGs to some degree (Bird, 2010), which may trigger democratic participation and collective 
action. Collective action and the control over SNGs must however not always lead to favourable 
outcomes in terms of broader taxation and better governance. These are strongly depending on 
the level of cohesion and economic interest of elites, with the latter being key for collective 
decision-making on the sub-national level. Some elites might be in favour of improved taxation 
from a broader state-building perspective, while others might share the same interest to resist 
taxation (Jibao & Prichard, 2015). 
On a more general level, good subnational governance depends on the existence of strong local 
institutions, which are in turn crucially affected by the self-financing abilities of SNGs and their 
level of control over tax revenues (Bird, 2010). Regarding this, Figures 4 and 5 suggest that there 
is a serious lack of SNG financing in developing countries, which is likely to impact their overall 
abilities to provide quality institutions and strong subnational capacities. It would be out of the 
scope to study all the potential causes for this observation, but in general, it has been argued 
that there is a lack of international support to subnational taxation (Fjeldstad, 2014). Having this 
in mind, international donors might reconsider the role of subnational taxation as part of their 
efforts to significantly increase support to domestic revenue mobilisation (for instance with 
respect to the Addis Tax Initiative). In addition, despite the potentially strong implications for 
governance, there is lack of literature focusing on the relationship between governance, taxation 
and state-building on the subnational level (Prichard, 2016). This may again call for intensified 
research in the field. 
Policy options and experiences 
The political decision to assign taxing rights to local governments is in principle driven by a 
variety of factors. As noted above, there might be some compelling reasons for central 
                                                   
9 See, for instance, the recent K4D Helpdesk Report on taxation and growth (Kundt, forthcoming). 
14 
governments to restrict local taxation (e.g. concerns about the own revenue position for 
administrative deficiencies of SNGs.). It would be out of the scope of this rapid desk research 
report to address all aspects in detail, but in general, recent contributions to literature suggest 
that SNGs should be assigned only those taxes that are as closely related to beneficial spending 
as possible (Bird, 2010; Martinez-Vasquez, 2013). 
A widespread form of taxation at the subnational level is the taxation of property. Property taxes 
might be closest to be a “benefit tax” at the local level and bring some particular advantages that 
render them important for subnational taxation. These include a high degree of visibility, their 
revenue potential and stability of property taxes, comparably low compliance costs, and a close 
match between those who pay the tax and those who receive the benefits (i.e. local residents). 
Finally, from an equity perspective, property taxes can be progressive and thus serve 
distributional objectives. Some drawbacks of property taxes are their lack popularity (due to their 
high visibility), liquidity problems of low-income households, administrative costs due to 
revaluation and enforcement, as well as a lack of revenue growth potential (UN-HABITAT, 2015). 
Recent evidence from the African continent suggests that the success of property taxation and/or 
the reform of property taxes depends on a variety of factors. Jibao & Prichard (2015), drawing on 
experience from Sierra Leone for instance show that elite cohesion can be an important factor for 
the success of property tax reforms. Strong resistance of local elites sharing the same interests 
might be a significant impediment for local property taxation. By contrast, ethnic diversification 
can lead to a fragmentation of local elites can thus have an opposite effect. A third factor is the 
extent of local political opposition, since local oppositions might wish to secure financial 
independence from the central government by securing own tax revenues. Finally, competitive 
elections may incentivise tax collections and give rise to transparency, inclusiveness, and equity. 
Monkam & Moore (2015) stress that effective local property taxation requires a mixture of 
legislative reform, technical know-how and political will. On the administrative level, capacity 
building is regarded as a key factor for successful property taxation, with some minor reforms 
having strong impacts (e.g. cadastral survey or information sharing and alignment). Good 
governance and a visible link to the benefits of property taxation in terms of spending can 
contribute to the acceptance of property taxes, while elite resistance can be again a limiting 
factor. 
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Appendix A: Measurement of the informal sector 
Given the hidden nature of informal activities, it is challenging to determine the exact size of the 
informal sector. There exist various indirect and indirect approaches to measure the informal 
economy, all of which bringing their own limitations (for a recent overview, see Feige, 2016a, and 
Schneider & Buehn, 2018).   
Most of the data cited in the literature comes from the so-called “Multi Indicators, Multiple 
Causes” or MIMIC approach used for example in Schneider & Enste (2000). The MIMIC model 
relies on a “latent” variable that links multiple causes of the informal economy (e.g. taxation) to 
multiple indicators of the informal economy (e.g. labour force participation or cash demand). The 
latent variable is used to determine the size of the informal economy, but cannot be interpreted in 
isolation, that is as percentage of official GDP. For this, it needs to be further calibrated to a 
benchmarking value, which is usually derived by another estimation technique (Schneider & 
Enste, 2000; Gyomai & van de Ven, 2014).  
Despite its prevalence in the literature, which also includes some recent work of the IMF (Medina 
et al., 2017) and the World Bank (Benjamin et al., 2014), the validity of the MIMIC model has 
become subject to some serious criticism. In two recent publications, Feige (2016a, 2016b) 
among others addresses the lack of documentation and non-transparent use of the complex 
MIMIC procedure, which makes it impossible to replicate the estimates. The latter are also 
sensitive to the choice of indicators and causes, and the omission of some might cause biased 
results. In addition, some variables might also be related to the official rather then the informal 
sector (Gyomai & van de Ven, 2014). In addition, as argued by Kirchgässner (2017), the 
benchmarking values, which are used to calibrate the MIMIC models, can lead to an 
overestimation of the size of the shadow economy. 
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Appendix B: Presumptive taxes in Sub-Saharan Africa10 
Ghana. Starting in 1987, the Ghana Internal Revenue Service (IRS) relied on a simplified 
“Identifiable Grouping Taxation (IGT)” system for the purpose of presumptive taxation. Under this 
system, which has also been termed “associational taxation”, collection of presumptive taxes was 
outsourced to a total of 32 informal sector business associations. Notwithstanding an initial 
increase in revenue collections and an emerging taxpaying culture that resulted in high 
compliance rates, the IGT system had some serious inherent problems. The tax authorities, due 
to capacity constraints, were not able to monitor the associations effectively, with the latter often 
failing to pass the tax revenues collected. The IGT was eventually replaced by a presumptive 
Vehicle Income Tax in 2003, mainly due to the continuing decrease in revenues collected, which 
declined by about 1.4 percentage points between 1991 and 2003. However, the government now 
regularly engages with informal sector association when setting quarterly presumptive taxes. 
Tanzania. The Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) introduced a presumptive tax regime for small 
individual traders in 2001. The tax applies to traders with an annual turnover of less then USD 
9359 and is based on a progressive scheme. Since 2005, revenues from this presumptive tax 
are collected using a “Block Management System (BMS)”. Under the BMS, teams of tax 
collectors are assigned to geographical and/or sectoral blocks in which they identify small and 
medium businesses and levy presumptive taxes based on turnover. Where records are not 
available, the tax collectors estimate the turnover. The team is given specific revenue targets in 
order to measure performance. Altough the BMS lead to an increase in business registrations 
and a broader coverage of informal taxapyers, revenues collected by BMS teams are low. This is 
mainly due to serious capacity constraints in manpower. In addition, serious problems may arise 
from the concentration of all adminstrative functions under one tax office, namely identification, 
registration and administration. In particular, this might lead to corruption, poor internal controls, 
and arbitrary use of power. Finally, from an equity perspetive, TRA found regressivity in cases 
where businesses did not keep records. 
Zambia. The Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) introduced four types of informal sector taxes in 
2004 with the general objective to make compliance easier for informal firms: 1) a Turnover Tax 
(TOT) of 3% on individuals and small firms with an annual turnover of USD 50,000; 2) an annual 
presumptive tax on minibuses based on seating capacity (USD 150 for below 12, to USD 1,800 
for 64 and above; 3) an Advance Income Tax (AIT), which is a withholding tax from cross-border 
traders at 6% of value of imports exceeding USD 500; and 4) a base tax of USD 0.13 per day 
collected from market traders. These simplified taxes led to some increase in revenues collection 
attributed to the informal sector (0.3% of total income tax collected in 2003 compared to 1.8% in 
2009), with the majority of revenues coming from the AIT (71%) and the TOT (27%). In total, 
however, the success of the presumptive taxes was limited. Poor record keeping due to a lack of 
education contributed to relatively low revenue collections from TOT. In addition, administrative 
costs turned out to be still very high relative to the additional revenues collected, which was due 
to high labour intensity and a low awareness of the presumptive taxes. Finally, enforcement often 
failed because collectors were seen as not legitimate to collect taxes. 
Zimbabwe. The presumptive tax regime introduced in 2005 by the Zimbawbe Revenue Authority 
(ZIMRA) was initially restricted to the transport sector (particular informal urban transport 
                                                   
10 Source: Dube & Casale (2016). 
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operators) and later extended to a larger number of low-value business activities, such as 
hairdressing saloons, driving schools or informal traders. Revenue from presumptive taxes 
accounted to USD 1.39 million in 2009 and was nearly ten-times larger in 2011 (USD 13.3 
million). This, however, represents only 0.14% and 0.45% percent of revenues, respectively, 
which suggests that the presumptive tax regimes were not able to reap the full tax potential 
located in the informal sector. The limited success of the informal sector taxes has been related 
to a variety of factors, which included capacity constraints and corruption in the ZIMRA, selective 
enforcement, and cases of coercive tax collection. These limiting factors lead to significant 
difficulties in administrating the taxes, which were further accelerated through low levels of tax 
morale and a relatively high tax burden in some sectors. Furthermore, informal sector 
entrepreneurs frequently had to pay parafiscal charges to non-state actors and were often not 
properly informed about the taxes. Finally, from an equity perspective, the effects of the 
presumptive taxes were mixed, both with respect to the unequal treatment of formal and informal 
firms with similar income levels, as well as the equity effects on informal sector firms in different 
business setors, but with a comparable income. 
